

National Intelligence Council

15 March 1982

NOTE FOR THE DCI

When you've read this, Dick and I
are ready to discuss it at your convenience.

Harry Rowen
C/NIC

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

15 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : The Warning Account

1. Harry has filled me in on your discussions with regard to [redacted] and the warning responsibility. My views are as follows, on the assumption that [redacted] is chosen as my successor. 25X1

2. The warning account has three inter-related functions:

A. Monitor the course of events world-wide to determine whether the Community is providing adequate warning; frame alternate hypotheses; flag anodyne interpretations.

B. On the basis of A, ensure that warning is issued and understood at policy level; coordinate the Community response; ensure that the focus of policymakers on the immediate crisis does not blind them to other potential crises.

C. Monitor Community performance with respect to B and seek ways to improve it; troubleshoot the warning machinery; advise the DCI on programmatic and budgetary issues related to warning. Three of the more important tasks that need attention are:

-- Improvement of the NATO warning machinery: there is no effective link between US/British intelligence recognition of a threat and the NATO political decision to respond.

-- Development of systematic participation by CIA and State in the strategic warning problem.

-- Training of analysts in alternative hypothesis techniques.

3. Function A is entirely substantive, but Functions B and C are primarily managerial. The successful accomplishment of B and C requires

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vesting the responsibility for them in someone in a bureaucratically senior and central position who is a skilled manager and commands the respect of the Community. (See HPSCI'S recommendation that the DCI create a "focal point" for warning, specifically including budgetary matters.)

4. [] is superb at function A, but he is a loner who has been a disaster as a manager. While [] does not have Cochran's substantive brilliance, he is an effective manager who can handle functions B and C and who will have the position and rank to do so. It is possible, moreover, to devise an arrangement that takes advantage of their complementary strengths:

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-- Vest the overall warning responsibility in [] as one of his primary duties. This will give the warning account the visibility and clout it needs, while leaving [] free to spend most of his time on other matters. Authority over the NIOs is essential to making the warning machinery work. [] will have it and can exercise it. [] won't have it and couldn't use it if he had.

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-- Make [] his special assistant for warning, with responsibility for Function A. This will strengthen [] where he needs it, and enable him to act largely as a conduit. [] might need a junior assistant. I believe [] would be much more comfortable in this role than having the full managerial portfolio; he knows his limitations.

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
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-- Provide [] with a small staff, probably headed by a DOD representative, to assist him in Functions B and C. This group would work directly for him, but would be guided substantively by [] output.

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5. Such a set-up would make the most of both men and enable you to provide the Community with the leadership it needs in this field.


Richard Lehman

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